Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2015

Clearfield City, Plaintiff/Appellee v S. Steven Maese, Defendant/
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, City v Maese, No. 20150962 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2015).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3493

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Case NQ 20150962-CA

3Jn tbe mltab Qtourt of ~ppeals
Clearfield City,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
-v-

S. Steven Maese,
Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Appellant
Appeal from a conviction of Speeding, a class C misdemeanor under
Utah Code § 41-6a-601, reduced· to an infraction upon the City's motion.
This judgment was entered in the Second Judicial District Court, Farmington Dep artment, the Honorable John R. Morris presiding.
The Appellant is not incarcerated.

STUART WILLIAMS

(8995)
CLEARFIELD CITY ATTORNEY
55 SOUTH STATE STREET
CLEARFIELD, UTAH 84015

R. SHANE JOHNSON
75 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 201
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
801-364-2222

Counsel for Appellee

Counsel for Appellant
ORAL ARGUMENTS R EQUESTED

Case NQ 20150962-CA

Jfn tbe mtab <teourt of ~ppeals
Clearfield City,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
-v-

S. Steven Maese,
Defendant and Appellant.

Brief of Appellant
Appeal from a conviction of Speeding, a class C misdemeanor under
Utah Code § 41-6a-601, reduced to an infraction upon the City's motion.
This judgment was entered in the Second Judicial District Court, Farmington Department, the Honorable John R. Morris presiding.
The Appellant is not incarcerated.

STUART WILLIAMS (8995)

R. SHANE JOHNSON

CLEARFIELD CITY A TIORNEY
55 SOUTH STATE STREET
CLEARFIELD, UTAH 84015

75 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 201
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
801-364-2222

Counsel for Appellee

Counsel for Appellant
ORAL ARGUMENTS REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... i
Table of Authorities ......................................................................................................... iii
Statement of Jurisdiction ................................................................................................. 1
Statement of Issues ........................................................................................................... 1
Rules, Statutes, and Constitutional Provisions ............................................................ 3
Statement of the Case ....................................................................................................... 3
Statement of Facts ............................................................................................................. 5
Summary of Argument .................................................................................................... 5
Argument ........................................................................................................................... 7
POINT I.

Under the Utah Constitution's Separation of Powers Clause,
Cities Charging and Courts Adjudicating LegislativelyDesignated Misdemeanors as Infractions is Prohibited .................. 7

A. Designating the penalty for an offense is an essential legislative
function which cannot be assumed by, or delegated to, another
branch .............................................................................................................. 7
B. Utah Code designates speeding a misdemeanor and prohibits any
reduction in the level of an offense before conviction........................... 11
C. The only mechanism for reducing an offense's designation must be
invoked post-conviction ............................................................................. 14
D. The Utah Supreme Court's rulemaking authority cannot permit a
change in a criminal offense's designation .............................................. 15
E. The district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an offense
not designated in Utah Code. Its only authority is to dismiss .............. 18

POINT II. The Utah Constitution Unequivocally Guarantees Defendants
Charged with Infractions the Right of Trial by Jury ...................... 19
A. The plain language of the Utah Constitution guarantees the right to
jury trials in all cases ................................................................................... 20
B. The framers conceived of no circumstance, whether civil or
criminal, under which the right to trial by jury should be denied ....... 22
C. Utah's traditions when the constitution was adopted entitled those
charged with petty offenses to jury trials ................................................. 26
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 31

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

Am. Bush v. City of 5. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, 140 P.3d 1235 ....................................... 20
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970) ....................................................................... 29
Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n v. Gibbons Realty, 668 P.2d 535 (Utah 1983) ............... 16
Carter v. Lehi City, 2012 UT 2, 269 P.3d 141 ................................................................... 7
Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, 158 P.3d 540 ................................................................... 17
Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, 24 P.3d 958 ................................ 15
Hurricane City v. Barlow, 2009 UT App 115 ................................................................... 5
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d
418 (Utah 1981) ........................................................................................................ 2, 23

Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994) ........................................................ 20
Salt Lake CihJ v. Robinson, 39 Utah 260, 116 P.442 (Utah 1911) ................................. 30
State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, 217 P.3d 682 ............................................................... 14, 15
State v. Gallion, 572 P. 2d 683 (Utah 1977) ...................................................................... 8
State v. Hernandez, 2011 UT 70,268 P.3d 822 ............................................... 2, 20, 22, 27
State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995) ................................................................. 10, 11
State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, 97 P.3d 732 ............................................................. 19
State v. Todd, 2004 UT App 266, 98 P.3d 46 ................................................................. 18
Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) .................................... 18, 19
West Valley City v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ....................... 5, 17
STATUTES

Utah Code § 41-6a-202(2) (2013) ................................................................................... 12
Utah Code § 41-6a-601 ................................................................................................... 14
Utah Code§ 76-1-103(1) ................................................................................................. 12
Utah Code§ 76-1-105 ..................................................................................................... 12

,.., 111,..,

Utah Code§ 76-3-102 ............................................................................................... 12, 31
Utah Code§ 76-3-105 ..................................................................................................... 12
Utah Code§ 76-3-201(2) ................................................................................................. 28
Utah Code § 76-3-402 ............................................................................................... 14, 18
Utah Code§ 77-1-6(2)(e) ................................................................................................ 19
Utah Code§ 78A-3-103(1) .............................................................................................. 16
Utah Code§§ 76-4-101 through -401 ............................................................................ 15
RULES

Utah R. Crim. P. 17(d) .................................................................................................... 19
Utah R. Crim. P. 25(b)(4) ................................................................................................ 18
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Utah Const. Art. I,§ 10 ................................................................................................... 21
Utah Const. Art. I, § 10 (1896) ....................................................................................... 21
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 ................................................................................................... 21
Utah Const. Art. V, § 1 ..................................................................................................... 8
Utah Const. art. VIII,§ 4 ................................................................................................ 16
OTHER AUTHORITIES

Box Elder News, "Jury Disagrees," July 29, 1915 ....................................................... 29
Deseret Evening News, "A Jury Trial," April 24, 1895 ............................................. 29
Deseret Evening News, "Demanded a Jury Trial," March 22, 1897........................ 29
Deseret Evening News, "Police Court Notes," February 12, 1897 .......................... 29
Deseret Evening News, "Police Court," October 14, 1895 ........................................ 29
Deseret Evening News, "Police Court," September 27, 1893 ................................... 29
Deseret Evening News, "Today's Police Court," July 10, 1895 ............................... 29
Deseret News, "Busy Day in Ogden Police Court: Continuous Session of Eight
Hours- Jury Failed to Agree on Walter Smith's case," March 4, 1903 ............... 30
Deseret News, "Jury in Vagrancy Case," February 24, 1909 .................................... 29
-1v-

VP

Deseret News, "Those Vagrancy Cases: Sentences in Six of Them Were
Corrected With the City System," July 1, 1901 ....................................................... 29
Jury Trial Resolution, 1996 General Session, November 27, 1995 Draft ................. 26

Minutes of tire Utah Constitutional Revision Commission, December 8, 1995 ....... 21, 25
V!J)

Proposition No. 3: Jury Trial Resolution, Utah Voter Information Pamphlet, 1996 .. 25
UTAH COMP. LAWS§ 4378 ........................................................................................ 28
UTAH COMP. LAWS§ 4401 ........................................................................................ 28

vJ

UTAH COMP. LAWS§ 4438 ........................................................................................ 28
UTAH COMP. LAWS§ 4479 ........................................................................................ 28
UTAH COMP. LAWS§ 4484 ........................................................................................ 28

v;J

UTAH COMP. LAWS§ 4515 ........................................................................................ 28
UTAH COMP. LAWS§ 4519 ........................................................................................ 28
UTAH COMP. LAWS§ 4522 ........................................................................................ 28
UTAH COMP. LAWS§ 4524 ........................................................................................ 29
UTAH COMP. LAWS§ 4525 ........................................................................................ 29
UTAH COMP. LAWS§ 4573 ........................................................................................ 29
UTAH COMP. LAWS§ 4598 ........................................................................................ 29
UTAH COMP. LAWS§ 4997 ........................................................................................ 28

,...,v,..,

Case NQ 20150962-CA

Jfn tbe Wtab ~ourt of ~ppeals
Clearfield City,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
-1)-

S. Steven Maese,
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Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Under Utah Code Ann.§ 78A-4-103(2)(e), the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
over this matter. The Appellant, S. Steven Maese, appeals a conviction of Speeding, a class C misdemeanor under Utah Code § 41-6a-601, but reduced by motion
to an infraction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
POINT I.

The Utah Constitution states," ... no person charged with the exer-

cise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any
functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly
directed or permitted." Does the Utah Constitution's Separation of Powers clause
prevent prosecutors from designating the level of an offense or is lawmaking a
merely advisory exercise?

ST AN OARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE

Interpreting "the Utah Constitution is a question of law. We therefore review
[the district court's decision] for correctness .... " 1 Maese preserved this issue by
moving the trial court to dismiss the charges and by moving for a jury trial. 2
POINT II. The Utah Supreme Court stated it observed a "virtually unanimous
intention on the part of the framers of the Constitution to preserve a constitutional right to trial by jury in civil cases and in noncapital criminal cases." 3 Therefore, does Utah's constitutional right to a jury trial require jury trials for criminal
infractions?
ST AND ARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE

Again, interpreting "the Utah Constitution is a question of law. We therefore review [the district court's decision] for correctness .... " 4 Maese preserved this issue
by moving the trial court for a jury trial. 5

1

State v. Hernandez, 2011 UT 70, 1 3, 268 P.3d 822

2

R. at 117-127, 210-11.

3

International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d
418,419 (Utah 1981).

4

State v. Hernandez, 2011 UT 70, 1 3, 268 P.3d 822

s R. at 130-143.

RULES, STATUTES, AND CONSTITUTION AL
PROVISIONS
This Court's interpretation of the following rules, statutes, and constitutional
provisions is important to the issues on appeal and their full texts, along with
the trial court's findings and conclusions are attached at ADDENDUM A:
RULES

• Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 4(d);
STATUTES

• Utah Code§ 76-1-105.
• Utah Code§ 76-1-103(1).
• Utah Code § 76-3-402.
CONSTITUTION AL PROVISIONS

• Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 10.
• Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12.
• Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 21, 2013, Clearfield City charged, by information, Santiago Steven
Maese with Speeding, a class C misdemeanor under Utah Code§ 41-6a-601.6 On
November 13, 2014, the City amended the charge to an infraction.7 On January

6

R. at 62.

7

R. at 84.

28, 2015 and on constitutional grounds, Maese moved for a jury trial. s The Justice
Court denied the motion. 9
Following a bench trial on July 8, 2015, Judge James L. Beesley convicted
Maese of Speeding. 10 Judge Beesley sentenced Maese to three days in jail, suspending the jail upon payment of the fine. 11 Maese forfeited his posted bail.12
Maese sought a trial de novo and the justice court sent the case to district
court. 13 At the District court, on August 31, 2015, Maese moved to dismiss the
charges.1-1 The District court denied Maese's motion. 15 At trial on November 5,
2015, Maese verbally moved for jury trial. Maese moved for the jury under the
separation of powers argument detailed in his motion to dismiss. 16 The District
court denied the Motion. 17 The District court convicted Maese of Speeding. 18

8

R. at 42.

9

R. at 39.

10

R. at 17-18.

11

Ibid.

12

R. at 72.

13

R. at 16

14

R. at 117-127.

15

R. at 169-170.

16

R. at 210-11.

17

Ibid.

18

R. at 178-179.

~

~

~

~

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 8, 2013, Trooper Scott Wilson of the Utah Highway patrol saw Santiago Steven Maese driving 15 miles per hour over the posted speed limit. 19
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Courts throughout Utah rely on West Valley City v. McDonald for the proposition
that amending a misdemeanor to an infraction is perfectly legal. 20 And in the unpublished Hurricane City v. Barlow, citing McDonald, this Court stated in a footnote it "has previously determined that a city may charge a speeding violation as
an infraction rather than a class C misdemeanor." 21 But this is incorrect.

McDonald holds that amending misdemeanors to infractions does not violate
Utah R. Crim. P. 4( d). That holding is valid and Maese does not challenge it. But
that Court specifically stated Utah constitutional arguments were unpreserved.
Yet the Utah Constitution specifically separates powers between the branches
of government granting the legislative branch exclusive authority to define offenses and designate their penalties. Still, prosecutors across the state have
usurped the essential legislative function of designating the penalties for offenses. By prosecuting a legislatively defined misdemeanor as an infraction, Clear-

19

R. at 213.

20

West Valley City v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

21

Hurricane City v. Barlow, 2009 UT App 115.
-5--

field City (an executive branch) impermissibly exercises an essential legislative
function, violating Separation of Powers.
One of the legal side effects of reducing misdemeanors to infractions - if not
the very purpose-is depriving defendants of jury trials. But statutes and court
rules barring jury trials for even the most minor criminal offense, an infraction,
violate the Utah Constitution. The plain text of the Utah Constitution's jury trial
provision, taken with the drafters' clear intent and historical traditions of that
right in Utah, guarantee the right to trial by jury in all criminal prosecutions. Any
law or rule to the contrary it unconstitutional.

ARGUMENT
POINT I. Under the Utah Constitution's Separation of Powers Clause, Cities Charging and Courts Adjudicating Legislatively-Designated Misdemeanors as
Infractions is Prohibited.

Allowing prosecutors to unilaterally designate a misdemeanor as an infraction is
unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution's Separation of Powers clause; only
the legislature can define crimes and their penalties.
A. Designating the penalty for an offense is an essential legislative function

which cannot be assumed by, or delegated to, another branch.

The Utah Supreme Court stated in Carter v. Lehi City that prosecuting crimes is
the "quintessential executive act." 22 By charging and adjudicating legislativelydesignated misdemeanors as infractions, prosecutors and courts unconstitutionally usurps the essential legislative function of setting criminal penalties. No
statement of law or legal principle allows prosecutors to exercise the essential
legislative function of designating an offense's penalty. The Legislature never
delegated such autho~ity to prosecutors or courts, nor could it under the Utah
Constitution's Separation of Powers provision:
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial;
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to
one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to ei-

22

Carter v. Lehi City, 2012 UT 2,

,r 46, 269 P.3d 141 (citations omitted).

ther of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.23
In State v. Gallion, the Utah Supreme Court stated the intent of Separation of
Powers is to "prevent those, who exercise the power assigned by the Constitution to their department, from aggrandizement of their power, however derived,
by exercising functions appertaining to another department." 24

Gallion answered whether the Legislature properly delegated authority to the
Utah Attorney General to add, delete, or reschedule substances proscribed by the
Utah Controlled Substances Act. 25 The Utah Supreme Court held that delegation
violated Separation of Powers because it delegated to an executive branch official
the authority to define those same offenses and, effectively, fix their penalties. 26
That Court stated:
A determination of the elements of a crime and the appropriate punishment therefor are, under our Constitutional system, judgments, which
must be made exclusively by the legislature. 27

The Legislature is not permitted to abdicate or transfer to others the essential legislative function with which it is thus vested. 28

23 Utah Const. Art. V,

§ 1.

24 State v. Gallion, 572 P. 2d 683, 687 (Utah 1977).
25 Id. at 685.
26 Id. at 689.
27 Id. at 690.
- 8-

The power of the legislature to repeal or amend the penalty to be imposed
for crime is not a matter of judicial concern. It is part of the sovereign power of the state, and it is the exclusive right of the legislature to change or
amend it. 29
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court elucidated this bedrock principle
nearly a century ago in Ex parte United States. 30 There, a federal district court
judge declined to impose a mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by Congress after taking into account "the peculiar circumstances" of the defendant
which the judge reckoned warranted leniency. 31 The Court declined to recognize
inherent judicial authority to disregard statutorily defined crimes and punishments crafted through the legislative process. The Court explained:

... if it be that the plain legislative command fixing a specific punishment
for crime is subject to be permanently set aside by an implied judicial
power upon considerations extraneous to the legality of the conviction, it
would seem necessarily to follow that there could be likewise implied a
discretionary authority to permanently refuse to try a criminal charge because of the conclusion that a particular act made criminal by law ought
not to be treated as criminal. And thus it would come to pass that the possession by the judicial department of power to permanently refuse to en-

28

Id. at 687 (quoting Western Leather and Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission, 87
Utah 227, 231, 48 P.2d 526, 528 (1935)).

29

Id. at 688 (quoting Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 380,381,483 P.2d 425 (1971)).

30

Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916).

31

See id. at 38-39.

force a law would result in the destruction of the conceded powers of the
other departments and hence leave no law to be enforced. 32
Where the overstepping judge in Ex parte United States actually considered
facts and circumstances warranting leniency, here, the district court considered
nothing before allowing a misdemeanor to be charged as an infraction.
By designating speeding a misdemeanor, the Legislature determined that a
jail sentence may be warranted, at least under some set of circumstances. But
here, the prosecution decrees (and the trial court allows) that no set of circumstances exists warranting a jail sentence; not for a habitual violator; not for putting others in extreme danger. In this case, the trial court "permanently set aside"
a "plain legislative command fixing a specific punishment for crime," without
inquiring into the offense's underlying factual allegations or the offender.
Beyond State v. Gallion and Ex parte United States, we find another Utah analogue in State v. Mohi. There, the Utah Supreme Court struck a statute allowing
prosecutors to choose, with no statutory guidance, whether to prosecute minors
charged with serious offenses as juveniles or adults, as unconstitutional.33 It
stressed that "the classic 'prosecutorial discretion' question is which law to apply

32

Id. at 42.

33

State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1006 (Utah 1995) The Mohi Court never considered
whether the statute violated Separation of Powers, but found it violated
Utah's Uniform Operation of Laws provision.
-10 --

to an offender rather than how to apply the same law to different offenders." 34 To
that end, "Once an offender is charged with a particular crime, that offender
must be subjected to the same or substantially similar procedures and exposed to
the same level of jeopardy as all other offenders so charged to satisfy the constitutional requirement of uniform operation of the laws." 35
By accepting an amendment of statutory misdemeanors to infractions, the trial court improperly permitted Clearfield to assume the essential legislative function of fixing the penalty for Speeding. This contradicts the Utah Constitution's
mandate that "no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging
to one ... department[], shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the
others." 36
Under the Utah Constitution, only the legislature has the power to define
crimes and prescribe penalties.
B. Utali Code designates speeding a misdemeanor and proliibits any reduc-

tion in tlie level of an offense before conviction.

Although the Utah Constitution prohibits executive and judicial authority to reduce misdemeanors to infractions, Utah Code is equally clear on the subject.

34

Id. at 1004 (citation omitted) (emphasis by the Court).

35

Ibid.

36

Utah Const. art. V,

§

1.
~11 ~

Long ago the Utah Legislature abolished common law crimes providing that
"no conduct is a crime unless made so by this code, other applicable statute or
ordinance." 37 The Code designates offenses as "felonies, misdemeanors, or infractions." 38 And the Legislature determined "[a]ny offense which is an infraction within this code is expressly designated ... " 39 At the time of Maese's offense,
the Legislature designated that a "violation of any provision of the [Traffic Code]
is a class C misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided." 40 Subsequently, the Legislature redesignated much of the Traffic Code, amending most violations to infractions, but it retained speeding as a class C misdemeanor. 41 Finally, and most
importantly, the Legislature mandates that "[t]he provisions of this code shall
govern the construction of, the punishment for, and defenses against any offense
defined in this code." 42

37

Utah Code§ 76-1-105.

3s

Utah Code§ 76-3-102 (2013).

39

Utah Code § 76-3-105.

40

Utah Code § 41-6a-202(2) (2013).

41

See H.B. 348, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2015) (amending Utah Code § 41-6a202(2) to make all traffic offenses infractions "unless otherwise provided,"
and adding language specifically providing that speeding is a class C misdemeanor).

-12

Utah Code§ 76-1-103(1) (emphasis added).
-12-

Unquestionably, the above code governs the designation of offenses. But this
Court's decision in West Valley City v. McDonald implies that prosecutors are free
to reduce misdemeanors to infractions. So a thought experiment: If an executive
can choose to reduce an offense's designation at will, what prevents it from increasing an offense's designation? Utah Code. We have no prosecutions for felony jaywalking, nor infraction homicide, because of Utah Code. An offense's
designation can be no more, and no less, than what statute mandates.
The trial court questioned whether Maese' s interpretation would prohibit
prosecutorial discretion to plea bargain. 43 The answer, again, lies in Utah Code.
Another thought experiment: Without using distinguishable facts, could an executive plea bargain capital murder to a class C misdemeanor? Theoretically, yes.
But this is because of lesser included offenses: Capital homicide (death penalty)
could be charged as aggravated murder, a first degree felony (25 to life); aggravated murder could be charged as murder (15 to life), a first degree felony; murder could be charged as attempted murder, a second degree felony; attempted
murder could be charged as aggravated assault, either a second or third degree
felony; aggravated assault could be charged as attempted aggravated assault, a
Class A misdemeanor; attempted aggravated assault could be charged as assault,
a Class B misdemeanor; assault could be charged as attempted assault, a Class C

43

See R. at 192.
-13-

misdemeanor. And all of these charges are permissible under the same facts as
lesser included offenses. This example shows prosecutors' ability to pick which
crime to charge. But charging homicide as an infraction is impossible under the
statutory scheme. Charging speeding as an infraction is equally impossible.
At the time of the offense, the Legislature designated speeding as a class C
misdemeanor under its catchall provision, 44 and it has since done so explicitly. 45
Although the Legislature prescribes a precise process to reduce the level of an offense after conviction, 46 it prescribes no such process for reducing an offense's
designation before conviction.
In this case, the trial court allowed Clearfield to charge speeding as an infraction, despite Utah Code designating it a Class C Misdemeanor. This charge is
nonexistent and therefore contrary to Utah Code.
C. The only mechanism for reducing an offense's designation must be invoked post-conviction.

In State v. Barrett, the Utah Supreme Court suggested a court commits a "rogue"
act by reducing the degree of an offense without legislative authorization.47 Bar-

44

See Utah Code§ 41-6a-601. (2013)

45

See Utah Code§ 41-6a-601(4) (2015) (speeding "is a class C misdemeanor").

46

See Utah Code§ 76-3-402 "Conviction of lower degree of offense - Procedure
and limitations"

47

State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, , 13, 217 P.3d 682.
-- 14 --

rett held the trial court abused its discretion by reducing a conviction two levels
without agreement from the prosecution, as required under section 76-3-402. 48
The processes prescribed for reducing offenses after conviction, or through
the prosecution of inchoate offenses, -1 9 would be superfluous if prosecutors and
judges were free to do so at whim. In Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corrections, this
Court stated that courts must "avoid interpretations that will render portions of a
statute superfluous or inoperative," thus "when two statutory provisions conflict
in their operation, the provision more specific in application governs over the
more general provision." 50 No provision of Utah Code permits reducing the level
of offense before conviction. Thus the specific provisions governing reductions of
offenses, section 402, must govern.
D. Tlte Utalt Supreme Court's rulemaking autltority cannot pennit a cltange
in a criminal offense's designation.

The plain language of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure grants no
authority to accept an amended information reducing an offense's statutory des-

-18

Id. at ,r 46.

49

See Utah Code§§ 76-4-101 through -401; for instance, an attempt to commit a
class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor (see Utah Code § 76-4102(1 )(h). ).

50

Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, ,r 15, 24 P.3d 958 (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
-- 15 --

ignation. Rule 4 never provides that speeding is an infraction, nor does it provide
or so much as imply the authority to reduce the level of an offense.
The Utah Supreme Court's rulemaking authority is limited by constitution
and statute to rules relating to "procedure and evidence for use in the courts." 51
In Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n v. Gibbons Realty, the Utah Supreme Court distinguished between procedural and substantive rules, which lie outside of its rulemaking authority:
Practice and procedure encompass the course, form, manner, means,
method, mode, order, process or steps by which a party enforces substantive rights or obtains redress for the invasion. 'Practice and procedure'
may be described as the machinery of the judicial process as opposed to the
product thereof s2
By permitting the arbitrary designation of offense levels, courts impermissibly
determine the substantive "product" of the judicial process. In this case, the trial
court has decreed not a procedural step, but the outcome of the process-a conviction or acquittal for an infraction rather than a misdemeanor.

51

Utah Const. art. VIII,§ 4; Utah Code§ 78A-3-103(1).

52

Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n v. Gibbons Realty, 668 P.2d 535, 539 (Utah 1983)
(quoting Avila South Condominium Assoc. v. Kappa Corp., Fla., 347 So.2d 599, 608
(1977)).

Also, the trial court's reliance on West Valley City v. McDonald is misplaced. 53
Given the arguments before it, this Court in McDonald was necessarily limited to
considering the rights of the defendant under Rule 4. Whereas here, Maese challenges the authority of courts and prosecutors to designate the penalty for an offense under the Utah Constitution. Just as the First Amendment does not
explicitly prohibit treasonous speech, it does not permit it either. At that, this
Court in McDonald never addressed whether an interpretation of Rule 4 that
permits the amendment of a misdemeanor to an infraction exceeded courts'
rulemaking authority or violated Separation of Powers. It does both.
The McDonald Court acknowledged, "The charge in the amended information- speeding ... -was exactly the same as in the original information; only

the classification, and therefore the penalty, was changed." 54 Prosecutors and judges
enjoy no authority under Utah law to change the penalty for an offense.
Accordingly, under the interpretive maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius
("the inclusion of one implies the exclusion of the alternative"), 55 the Legislature
prohibits the prosecutorial and judicial authority claimed here. That is, the Legis-

53

See Ruling & Order, p. 3, ,r 1 (citing McDonald, 948 P.2d 371, 373-74 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997)).

54

West Valley City v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371, 373-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added).

55

Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, if 15, 158 P.3d 540.
--17 --

lature has expressed when and how the level of an offense may be reducedafter conviction, by the court, upon a number of certain findings, and limited by
certain conditions - meaning it cannot be done otherwise. 56 And, as discussed
above, to do so violates the Utah Constitution's Separation of Powers provision.
E. The district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an offense not
designated in Utah Code. Its only authority is to dismiss.

Under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 25, "The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when ... [t]he court is without jurisdiction.... " 57 In Thomp-

son v. Jackson, this Court stated subject matter jurisdiction "is the power and
authority of the court to determine a controversy and without which it cannot
proceed." 58 "If a court acts beyond its authority those acts are null and void." 59 In

State v. Todd it stated subject matter jurisdiction "is derived from the law."60 "It
can neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused." 61 In criminal
cases, "[t]he trial court simply would lack the judicial power to convict the de-

56 See Utah Code § 76-3-402.
57

Utah R. Crim. P. 25(b)(4).

58

Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).

59

Ibid.

60 State v. Todd, 2004 UT App 266,

,r 9, 98 P.3d 46.

61 Ibid.
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fendant of a nonexistent crime." 62 "Upon a determination by the Court that its jurisdiction is lacking, its authority extends no further than to dismiss the action." 63
In Utah Code, infraction speeding is nonexistent. Utah courts lack subject
matter jurisdiction over non-existent offenses. Accordingly, the trial court retains
only the authority to dismiss the action against Maese.
POINT II. The Utah Constitution Unequivocally Guarantees Defendants Charged
with Infractions the Right of Trial by Jury.

Analyzing the Utah Constitution's text, historical context, and Utah's traditions
at the time of its adoption reveals the Constitution guarantees the right to jury
trials in all criminal cases, including prosecutions for infractions. Yet Utah Code
and the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provide jury trials for all offenses except infractions. 64
The framers of the Utah Constitution, however, viewed the right of a trial by
jury as sacrosanct in all criminal and civil cases, and conceived of no circumstance by which that right should be denied; including the right to a jury trial for
so-called "petty" offenses which was well established in the Utah territory long
before, and in the state long after, the Constitution was adopted.

62

State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, ,I 21, 97 P.3d 732.

63

Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted).

6-1

See Utah Code§ 77-1-6(2)(e); Utah R. Crim. P. 17(d).
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Accordingly, any Utah statute or procedural rule denying the right of a jury
trial in prosecutions for infractions is unconstitutional.
A. The plain language of tlte Utali Constitution guarantees the right to jury
trials in all cases.
In American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, the Utah Supreme Court stated when
II

courts interpret the Utah Constitution, courts should analyze its text, historical
evidence of the state of the law when it was drafted, and Utah's particular traditions at the time of drafting." 65 A court's goal is to discern the intent and purII

pose of both the drafters of our constitution and, more importantly, the citizens
who voted it into effect." 66
II

In State v. Hernandez, the Utah Supreme Court stated because the best evi-

dence of the drafters' intent is the text itself, our analysis begins with a review of
the constitutional text." 67 And in Salt Lake City v. Ohms, it stated, if a constitu11

tional provision is clear, then extraneous or contemporaneous construction may
not be resorted to."68
In its current state, Article I,

§

10 of the Utah Constitution states:

65 Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40,

if 12, 140 P.3d 1235.

66 Ibid.
67 State v. Hernandez, 2011 UT 70,
ted).

,r 8,268 P.3d 822 (citations and quotations omit-

68 Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 850, n. 14 (Utah 1994).
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In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital
cases the jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases,
the jury shall consist of no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the
Legislature shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases the verdict
shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a
verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded. 69
Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution states in relevant part:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right ... to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed ... 70
In 1996, a ballot measure amended Article I, § 10 to accommodate the consolidation of circuit courts into the district court system. 71 The original provision
stated:
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths
of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless
demanded.72
Here, sections 10 and 12 are plain and unambiguous. These provisions guarantee the right of a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions. Section 10 addresses ju-

69

Utah Const. Art. I,

70

Utah Const. Art. I,§ 12.

71

Minutes of the Utah Constitutional Revision Commission, pp. 12-13, December 8,
1995, attached in Addendum B.

§

10.

72 Utah Const. Art. I, § 10 (1896).
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ry trials in general, and by the language, "In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of jurors," "in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than four
persons," and "In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous," the section
contemplates no situation where a defendant in a criminal action would not be
entitled to a jury.

If the drafters intended to limit the right based on the possibility of incarceration, they would have stated so explicitly. Section 12 addresses the rights of criminal defendants in particular, stating, "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right ... to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury." This language is also unequivocal, making no provision for a prosecution lacking the
right to a jury trial.
B. The framers conceived of no circumstance, whether civil or criminal, un-

der which the right to trial by jury sliould be denied.

Assuming ambiguous text, the Utah Supreme Court stated constitutional interpretation may also be informed by "historical evidence of the drafters' intent." 73
In Intern. Han,ester Credit v. Pioneer Tractor, the Utah Supreme Court squarely
held that article I,§ 10 guarantees the right to a jury trial in all civil cases. The
court's reasoning there was equally if not more applicable to criminal jury trials:

73

State v. Hernandez, 2011 UT 70, 18,268 P.3d 822 (citations and alterations omitted).
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The wording of Article I, § 10 lends itself to argument over the intended
meaning as to noncapital criminal cases and civil cases .... A careful reading, however, of the proceedings of the constitutional convention, Official
Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention, 1895, Vol. I, Pages
258-62, 274-97, 492-95, discloses a virtually unanimous intention on the
part of the framers of the Constitution to preserve a constitutional right
to trial by jun1 in civil cases and in noncapital criminal cases.
Although there was dispute in the convention over the number of jurors,
and the degree of concurrence necessary for a verdict, there is repeated
reference to the intention to insure the underlying right of trial by jury. The
whole tenor of the discussion in the constitutional convention, the preliminary drafts, and the final language of Article I,§ 10, indicates no intention
to limit the constitutional right to a jury to capital criminal cases .
. . . the constitutional designation of the number of jurors to be used in
courts of original jurisdiction and in courts of inferior jurisdiction presupposes the existence of the basic right itself. It is not plausible that the framers would mandate the number of jurors to be used in a jury, and the
number of jurors required to return a verdict, without intending to secure
the basic right itself.

The jury historically has been an integral part of the Anglo-American legal
system. It would require the clearest language to sustain the conclusion
that there was an intention to abolish an institution so deeply rooted in
our basic democratic traditions and so important in the administration of
justice, not only as a buffer between the state and the sovereign citizens of
the state, but also as a means for rendering justice between citizens. We refuse to give a strained meaning to the terms of our Constitution which
would result in dispensing with an institution that has the sanction of the
centuries. 74

Intern. Harvester Credit v. Pioneer Tractor, 626 P.2d 418, 419-20 (Utah 1981) (emphasis added).

74
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Thus, whether infractions are criminal or civil in nature, there is no question
that Maese was entitled to a jury trial.
Indeed, the debate over the original provision never considered circumstances
whereby a civil litigant or criminal defendant would be denied the right to trial
by jury. The debate was whether the number of jurors in any case should remain
at 12, or be reducible by constitution or statute. And no delegate understood the
right to be limited by the potential punishment attached to an offense. In fact, arguing against the ultimately successful reduction in the number of jurors for
noncapital felonies and "other cases," delegate John Rutledge Bowdle said:
I claim that a man's liberty is not in jeopardy only when the doors of the
penitentiary may stand before him, or when his life is at stake. His reputation might be just as sacred, or more sacred than his life. I believe that
when a man is on trial for any crime he should have a fair and impartial
trial by a jury, as the gentleman concedes, the best jury, that is a jury of
twelve ... 75
The 1996 article I, section 10 amendment explicitly intended a technical rather
than substantive change. Members of the Constitutional Revision Committee
which proposed the amendment to the Legislature, including two now-former
Utah Supreme Court chief justices, never intended to alter the substance of the
right as it has stood since the founding. The reason for the amendment was to

75

Official Report of The Proceedings And Debates Of The Convention Assembled To Adopt A Constitution For The State Of Utah, 291-92 (1898), attached
in Addendum B.
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address the consolidation of inferior circuit courts with general jurisdiction district courts by establishing jury size based upon the type of case at issue rather
than the type of court. 76
The Utah Constitutional Revision Commission understood that Utah courts
have not determined if Utah's constitutional jury right extends to those charged
with petty offenses or infractions, and they never intended for the amendment to
resolve that issue.
Mr. James Housley, Deputy District Attorney, Salt Lake County .. ._expressed concern that one could argue that people are entitled to a jury trial, even for petty offenses. Under federal constitutional provisions there
have been a number of cases that have differentiated between petty cases
and serious cases, he said. The differentiation is basically at six months potential incarceration but Utah Supreme Court cases have discussed the differentiation without actually holding that this is what is covered by the
state constitution. He said they would likely not be precluded from using
the federal interpretation. He requested that the use of the word 'shall' not
be intended to change the jurisprudence surrounding the right to jury trial.77

Then-Chief Justice Michael Zimmerman stated the Commission's "express intention is not to change anything and not to affect existing case law." 78 Zimmer-

76

Minutes of the Utah Constitutional Revision Commission, pp. 12-13, December 8,
1995, attached in Addendum B; Proposition No. 3: Jury Trial Resolution, Utah
Voter Information Pamphlet, p. 27, 1996, attached in Addendum B.

77

Minutes of the Utah Constitutional Revision Commission, pp. 14-15, December 8,
1995.

78

Id., p. 13.
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man's successor at the high court, Justice Christine Durham, agreed, indicating
"the Judicial Council's motivation in proposing the amendment was to maintain
the operational status quo under the constitution." 79 Yet the article I,§ 10,
amendment drafters could have easily restricted the right to offenses carrying the
possibility of incarceration, but consciously refrained.
In fact, early drafts of the proposed 1996 amendment, which took the form of
a joint resolution of the Utah Legislature, explicitly limited the right, stating,
"Parties have the right to trial by jury in any criminal case in which the Legislature has established a term of incarceration as a possible sentence." 80 But these
were ultimately rejected.
The article I, section 10 drafters-at the time of the framing, and a century later with the amendment- demonstrated no intention to restrict the jury trial right
based on the possibility of incarceration.
C.

Utah's traditions when the constitution was adopted entitled those
charged witli petty offenses to jury trials.

In State v. Hernandez, the Utah Supreme Court largely gleaned the framers' understanding of the right to a preliminary hearing in criminal cases by referring to

79

Id., p. 15.

80

See Jury Trial Resolution, 1996 General Session, November 27, 1995 Draft,
1996FL-0689/003, attached in Addendum B.
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the territorial laws in force at the time. 81 In finding that defendants have a constitutional right to preliminary hearings in prosecutions for class A misdemeanors,
despite no such federal right, the court stressed that Article XXIV, § 2 of the Utah
II

Constitution provides that All laws of the Territory of Utah now in force, not
repugnant to this Constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their
own limitations, or are altered or repealed by the Legislature." 82 Thus, the Her-

nandez Court ultimately applied the definition of indictable offenses found in the
Utah territorial laws.
By the same thinking, whether a defendant charged with an infraction is entitled to a trial by jury turns on the framers' understanding, the original public
II

II

meaning of the terms criminal cases" and criminal prosecutions," as used in
Article I, §§ 10 and 12. At the time of the framing, Utah territorial law provided:
A crime or public offense is an act committed or omitted in violation of a
law forbidding or commanding it, and to which is annexed, upon conviction, either of the following punishments:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Death.
Imprisonment.
Fine.
Removal from office; or,

81

State v. Hernandez, 2011 UT 70, iiii 11-21, 268 P.3d 822.

82

Id. at ii 12.

5. Disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust

or profit in this Territory.83
Accordingly, criminal offenses were not restricted to those punishable by
death or imprisonment, but also included those punishable by fine, removal from

office, or disqualification. The territorial law at the time of the framing stated, ls11

sues of fact must be tried by jury unless a trial by jury be waived in criminal cases not amounting to felony ... "84
Infractions under current Utah Code are materially the same: They are punishable by fine, forfeiture, and disqualification, or any combination. 85 Moreover,
the territorial Penal Code at the time of the framing defined numerous crimes not
punishable by imprisonment, or punishable by imprisonment of six months or
less, 86 the benchmark for "petty offenses" under federal constitutional jurisprudence beyond which a jury trial is guaranteed. 87

83 UTAH COMP. LAWS§ 4378 (1888) (emphasis added), attached in Addendum
B.
84 UTAH COMP. LAWS§ 5318 (1888), attached in Addendum B.
85 Utah Code § 76-3-201(2).
86 See UTAH COMP. LAWS§ 4401 (1888) (Taking rewards for deputation, punishable by $1,000 fine); § 4438 (Refusing to aid officers in arrest, etc., punishable by $100 fine); § 4479 (Duties of officers to prevent duels, punishable by
$500 fine); § 4484 (Assault, punishable by $300 fine and three months jail); §
4515 (Keeping open places of business on Sunday, punishable by $5-$100 fine);§ 4519 (Performing unnecessary labor on Sunday, punishable by $25 fine);
§ 4522 (Selling liquor at camp or field meetings, punishable by $5-$500 fine);§

Defendants charged with offenses not punishable by imprisonment or with
so-called "petty offenses," routinely demanded and received jury trials in justice
courts around the time of the framing of the Utah Constitution. 88

4524 (Procuring females to play on musical instruments in public, punishable
by $100 fine and one month jail); § 4525 (Procuring female to exhibit herself
for hire, punishable by $100 fine and one month jail); § 4573 (Putting extraneous substances in packages of goods usually sold by weight with intent to increase weight, punishable by $25 fine for each offense);§ 4598 (Disturbing the
peace, punishable by $200 fine and two months jail), attached in Addendum

B.
s7 See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (holding that potential imprisonment of greater than six months triggers right to jury trial under Sixth
Amendment).
88

See e.g., Box Elder News, "Jury Disagrees," July 29, 1915 (defendants charged
under city ordinance for failing to gain permission to sell fruit on railroad
company land, punishable by fine of $5 to $100, demanded and received a jury trial in justice court, resulting in a hung jury); Deseret Evening News, "Police Court," September 27, 1893 (defendant charged with violating ordinance
related to sewer connections tried by jury in justice of the peace court);
Deseret Evening News, "A Jury Trial," April 24, 1895 (defendant demanded
jury trial for vagrancy charge); Deseret Evening News, "Today's Police
Court," July 10, 1895 (defendant charged with building code ordinance received jury trial); Deseret Evening News, "Police Court," October 14, 1895
(defendant received jury trial for vagrancy); Deseret Evening News, "Police
Court Notes," February 12, 1897 (defendant set for trial for allowing females
in place of business after 9 p.m.); Deseret Evening News, "Demanded a Jury
Trial," March 22, 1897 (defendant demanded and received jury trial for
drunkenness); Deseret News, "Those Vagrancy Cases: Sentences in Six of
Them Were Corrected With the City System," July 1, 1901 (defendant found
guilty of vagrancy in jury trial); Deseret News, "Jury in Vagrancy Case," February 24, 1909 (defendant received jury trial in vagrancy case, punishable by

More than a century ago, in Salt Lake City v. Robinson, the Utah Supreme Court
addressed a very similar issue in determining whether punishment for violations
of municipal ordinances was civil or criminal in nature, the Court stated:
the courts of this state have always regarded the proceedings instituted for
violations of ordinances as in their nature criminal, and not civil. Trials, so
far, as we are aware have always been conducted upon that theory. Again
the rules of evidence and the quantum of proof, as well as the rules of construction and procedure applicable to criminal prosecutions, have always
been applied and enforced in prosecutions for violations of city ordinances
by the courts of this state .... We are clearly of the opinion that, under our
statutes, prosecutions like the one at bar are in their nature criminal, and
that the rules pertaining to criminal prosecutions for misdemeanors under
the statute are applicable. 89
The same is true of infractions. That is, the rules of evidence, the quantum of
proof, and the rules of construction are the same in a prosecution for a felony,
misdemeanor, or infraction. The action is prosecuted by information in the name
of a governmental entity rather than a private party. The action is subject to the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure rather than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Defendants are subject to arrest for an infraction, and may be arrested if they fail
to appear and face the charge of an infraction, rather than face default judgment

three months jail); Deseret News, "Busy Day in Ogden Police Court: Continuous Session of Eight Hours- Jury Failed to Agree on Walter Smith's case,"
March 4, 1903 (defendant tried by jury for disturbing the peace, punishable by
$200 fine and two months jail), attached in Addendum B.
89

Salt Lake City v. Robinson, 39 Utah 260, 116 P.442 (Utah 1911).
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in a civil action for failing to timely answer. There is also no question that the
drafters of the "Utah Criminal Code" intended infractions to be "in their nature
criminal," when they designated criminal offenses as "felonies, misdemeanors,
or infractions." 90
Utah's traditions at the time the Constitution was adopted entitled defendants
to juries even for petty offenses, like infractions.
CONCLUSION
Maese respectfully requests this Court grant his appeal, declare as unconstitutional the practice of amending misdemeanors to infractions, declare as unconstitutional Utah Code subsection 77-1-6(2)(e) and Rule 17(d) of Criminal Procedure,
and order Judge John Morris to dismiss the Amended Information against Maese
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Petitioner also requests costs and, under
the Court's equitable powers, attorney's fees.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

90

on this 27th day of April, 2016.

Utah Code § 76-3-102.
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ADDENDUM A
(RULES, STATUTES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS)

Oral Arguments - September 28, 2015

13
1

THE COURT:

I'm just going to reiterate that McDonald

2

did not address the Utah Constitution. Period. My argument

3

distinguishes between the federal constitution's petty offense

4

kind of cutoff level and that of the Utah Constitution. At the

5

time of the framing, petty offenses were entitled to jury

6

trials, number one. Number two, the City argues that 4(d)

7

permits this authority. Nowhere in 4(d) does it say you can

8

reduce the level of offense. 4(d) says you can amend an

9

information and charge a different offense if the substantial

10

rights of so and so aren't impacted. 4(d) doesn't explicitly

11

prohibit this, but it cannot permit it, and it doesn't by its

12

plain terms permit it. It's been used when it was challenged,

13

when the defendant in McDonald said I have a right to a jury

14

trial; therefore, under 4(d), the amendment of the information

15

has impacted my rights, the court said no actually it did not

16

because you don't have a right to a jury trial under the

17

federal constitution if you're charged with a petty offense.

18

And we're not going to reach your claim that you have

19

a right to a jury trial under the state constitution because

20

you failed to raise it below. So 4(d) does not prohibit what's

21

being claimed here, but it cannot permit it under the Court's

22

limited rule making authority and under separation of powers.

23

And I'll leave it at that.

24

25

THE COURT:

Thank you, gentlemen. Let me address the

first motion. I assume that's the motion for a jury trial. I

THACKER TRANSCRIPTS
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1

struggle with getting past West Valley City v. McDonald, which

2

I did believe held that if you reduce a misdemeanor charge to

3

an infraction, the possibility of jail time evaporates and that

4

therefore under Rule 17(d) the defendant is not entitled to a

5

jury trial. The trial courts are the inferior courts. The

6

appellate courts, if they have ruled on a case, have

7

established by that ruling precedent which the trial courts

8

must follow. I find that I'm unable to distinguish McDonald and

9

would therefore have to conclude that in fact no jury trial

10
11

would be allowed for an infraction.
Now, addressing the other motion to dismiss, which

12

invokes separation of powers, to my mind, I think the

13

(inaudible) here is trying to prove too much. The defendant was

14

charged with an offense, and an existing offense, and therefore

15

I believe the courts have jurisdiction. Subject matter

16

jurisdiction. And I guess the defendant, the appellant here, is

17

arguing that the prosecutor doesn't have the authority to

18

reduce the offense to an infraction. And because he doesn't

19

have that authority, it removes the Court's subject matter

20

jurisdiction because he's being charged essentially with an

21

offense that doesn't exist.

22

Again, as I asked counsel, I do believe there's a

23

difference between the elements of the offense and the degree

24

of the offense. The existence of the elements of the offense

25

means it is a crime and the Court has subject matter

THACKER TRANSCRIPTS
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1

jurisdiction. The degree of the offense is generally charged as

2

provided. But here, we get into the authority of the prosecutor

3

to in fact prosecute the case in a manner which serves the

4

public interest and in accordance with the authority which it

5

was granted by applicable law, statutory decision or

6

constitutional.

7

So the argument that the prosecutor may not do this I

8

think goes a bit too far. The legislature gave City attorneys

9

the authority to prosecute certain criminal matters and the

10

authority extends from the constitution itself, which was all

11

cited, and was then embodied in the Utah code. Inherent in the

12

authority to prosecute would be the discretion or in the area

13

of how to move a case forward, prosecutorial discretion. I

14

don't see any problem with prosecutorial authority. It's

15

granted by the constitution as implemented by the legislature.

16

The prosecutors have the authority to bring charges, dismiss

17

charges, amend charges. They can, in fact, enter into diversion

18

types of agreements. Pleas in abeyance, for instance.

19

Prosecutors also have the authority to reduce the

20

degree of charges for any one of a number of reasons. Perhaps

21

the most important of which is that it affects sentencing. But

22

it also affects the ability or the impact a charge may have in

23

other areas of a defendant's life and whether or not that

24

charge in fact at some point can be removed from the record. So

25

the decision to reduce the misdemeanor traffic infraction-THACKER TRANSCRIPTS
801- 285- 9495 / t hacker tr ans er i pt s@Jrrei I . com
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VJ>

v;:

1

violation to an infraction appear to be within the authority

2

delegated to the prosecutor by the legislature, thus the

3

authority to prosecute cases and determine how that should go

4

forward. I don't find a violation of separation of powers in

5

the reduction of this charge to a misdemeanor. So I will

6

specifically find no violation of separation of powers. I will

7

find the prosecutor has the authority and the discretion to

8

prosecute cases as they choose and within the authority which

9

was conferred by our legislature, which does include some

10

discretion. And so I'm afraid I can't get there either. So I

11

will deny that motion as well.

12

So, gentlemen, where are we going from here?

13

MR. JOHNSON:

14

Well, Your Honor, I wonder if we can

discuss with the prosecution about a potential resolution?

15

(Counsel confer)

16

THE COURT:

17
18

You can use the conference room and I'll

just finish my calendar.
(PROCEEDING CONCLUDED)

19
20

21
22

23
24

25
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Rule 4. Prosecution of public offenses.
Utah Rules
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

As amended through January 1, 2016
Rule 4. Prosecution of public offenses

(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or information sworn
to by a person having reason to believe the offense has been committed.
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant is being
prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common law or by statute or by stating in
concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. If
issued, the information shall include the citation number. Failure to include the number will not
affect the court's jurisdiction. An information may contain or be accompanied by a statement of
facts sufficient to make out probable cause to sustain the offense charged where appropriate.
Such things as time, place, means, intent, manner, value and ownership need not be alleged
unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities, written instruments,
pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by any name or description by which they are
generally known or by which they may be identified without setting forth a copy. However, details
concerning such things may be obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law
nor matters of judicial notice need be stated.
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indictment or information.
(d) The court may permit an information to be amended at any time before trial has commenced
so long as the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. If an additional or different
offense is charged, the defendant has the right to a preliminary hearing on that offense as
provided under these rules and any continuance as necessary to meet the amendment. The court
may permit an indictment or information to be amended after the trial has commenced but before
verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant
are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or information may be amended so as to state the
offense with such particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the
same set of facts.
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a defendant of the
nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to prepare his defense, the
defendant may file a written motion for a bill of particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment

or within 14 days thereafter, or at such later time as the court may permit. The court may, on its
own motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars may be amended or
supplemented at any time subject to such conditions as justice may require. The request for and
contents of a bill of particulars shall be limited to a statement of factual information needed to set
forth the essential elements of the particular offense charged.
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any name contained therein may
be incorrectly spelled or stated.
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso contained in the statute
creating or defining the offense.
vi

(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual meaning unless they are
otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal meaning.
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate the indictment or
information.

0) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information was based shall be
endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall not affect the validity but endorsement
shall be ordered by the court on application of the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting

...J

attorney shall, except upon a showing of good cause, furnish the names of other witnesses he
proposes to call whose names are not so endorsed.
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to appear before the
magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel. Proceedings against a corporation shall
be the same as against a natural person.
History. Amended effective April 1, 2012; November 1, 2015.

§ 76-1-105. Common law crimes abolished.

Utah Statutes
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 1. General Provisions
Current through 3-28-2016

§ 76-1-105. Common law crimes abolished

Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a crime unless made so by this code, other
applicable statute or ordinance.
Cite as Utah Code§ 76-1-105
History. Amended by Chapter 32, 1974 General Session

§ 76-1-103. Application of code - Offense prior to effective date.

Utah Statutes
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 1. General Provisions
Current through 3-28-2016
§ 76-1-103. Application of code - Offense prior to effective date
(1)

The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the punishment for, and
defenses against any offense defined in this code or, except where otherwise specifically
provided or the context otherwise requires, any offense defined outside this code;
provided such offense was committed after the effective date of this code.

(2)

Any offense committed prior to the effective date of this code shall be governed by the
law, statutory and non-statutory, existing at the time of commission thereof, except that a
defense or limitation on punishment available under this code shall be available to any
defendant tried or retried after the effective date. An offense under the laws of this state
shall be deemed to have been committed prior to the effective date of this act if any of the
elements of the offense occurred prior thereto.

Cite as Utah Code§ 76-1-103
History. Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session
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§ 76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense - Procedure and limitations.

Utah Statutes
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
Chapter 3. Punishments
Current through 3-28-2016

§ 76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense - Procedure and limitations
(1)

If at the time of sentencing the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the

~.

offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the
defendant, and after having given any victims present at the sentencing and the
prosecuting attorney an opportunity to be heard, concludes it would be unduly harsh to
record the conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute, the court
may enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose

~

sentence accordingly.
(2)

If the court suspends the execution of the sentence and places the defendant on
probation, whether or not the defendant is committed to jail as a condition of probation, the

~

court may enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense:
(a)

after the defendant has been successfully discharged from probation;

(b)

upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney;

(c)

after reasonable effort has been made by the prosecuting attorney to provide

<.t,

notice to any victims;
(d)

after a hearing if requested by either party under Subsection (2)(c); and

(e)

if the court finds entering a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of

~

offense is in the interest of justice.
(3)

(a)

An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section, whether the
reduction is entered under Subsection (1) or (2), unless the prosecutor specifically

~

agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense may be reduced two
degrees.
(b)

In no case may an offense be reduced under this section by more than two
degrees.

(4)

This section does not preclude any person from obtaining or being granted an
expungement of his record as provided by law.

~

(5)

The court may not enter judgment for a conviction for a lower degree of offense if:
(a)

the reduction is specifically precluded by law; or

(b)

if any unpaid balance remains on court ordered restitution for the offense for which
the reduction is sought.

(6)

When the court enters judgment for a lower degree of offense under this section, the
actual title of the offense for which the reduction is made may not be altered.

(7)

(a)

A person may not obtain a reduction under this section of a conviction that requires
the person to register as a sex offender until the registration requirements under
Title 77, Chapter 41, Sex and Kidnap Offender Registry, have expired.

(b)

A person required to register as a sex offender for the person's lifetime under
Subsection 77-41-105(3)(c) may not be granted a reduction of the conviction for
the offense or offenses that require the person to register as a sex offender.

(8)

As used in this section, "next lower degree of offense" includes an offense regarding
which:
(a)

a statutory enhancement is charged in the information or indictment that would
increase either the maximum or the minimum sentence: and

(b)

the court removes the statutory enhancement pursuant to this section.

Cite as Utah Code § 76-3-402
History. Amended by Chapter 145, 2012 General Session, §12, eff. 5/8/2012.
Amended by Chapter 103, 2007 General Session

§ 10. Trial by jury.
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Article I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

Current through November 3, 2015

§ 10. Trial by jury

In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist
of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of no fewer than eight
persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no
event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases the verdict shall be
unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be
waived unless demanded.

§ 1. Three departments of government.

CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Article V. DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
Current through November 3, 2015

§ 1. Three departments of government

The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments,
vJJ

the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of
powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining
to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.

§ 12. Rights of accused persons.

CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Article I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

Current through November 3, 2015

§ 12. Rights of accused persons

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by
statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined
by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or
at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.

@
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Minutes of the Utah Constitutional Revision Commission
December 8. 1995
Page 12

not reflect an intentjon to change the statutory scheme or existing law.
Chair McKcachnie stated that the comrnhsion did not formally addre.i..s the intent
language noted on page 94 of the packet
Mr. Bird stated that the voter infonnation pamphlet could indicate that the commission
recommended and the legislature passed a resolution that appears to be antiquated and redundant
language and that there is no intent ro make a substantive change to law.

MOTION: Mr. Jensen moved to include. in the House and Senate Journals. and in the
voter information pamphlet~ the intent language;This deletion is not intended to make a
substanti\.•c change in the existing Jaw, .. found on page 94 of the packet.
Rep. Pignanelli asked how the intent language would be structured He expressed
concern how the comrnissfon could expre.~ the c]C(.'t.Orates intent.
Ms. Watts Baskin stated that the House and Senate Journals would reflect the intent of
the legislature in m~ing the amendment and the voters would know. through the Voter
lnfonnation Pamphlet. that the intent of the amendmenc was not to change current staturory
interpretation but merely to remove archaic language from the constitution.
11le commission voted on the motion which passed unanimously. Sens. Beattie and
Dmitrich, Justice Durham. Rep. Harward. and Ms. Wood were absent during the vote.
ThC' ('Ommission 1"('~5s-ed for lum:h.

S.

"Jury Trial Resolution," 1996FL-0689/003, 11-27-95 DRAFT
"Trial by Jury." l996FL-07611002, 11-29-95 DRAFT-

Chief Justice Micbae] D. Zimmerman, Utah Supreme Court, referred to the Letter on
page 99 of the packet thac was sent to the commission. When the coon consolidation biU passed
in 1991. it immediately consolidated the circuit and district courts in districts five through eight,
he said. He explained that the Utah Constitution requires cight•pcrson juries m the trial cour1 of
general jurisdiction. regardless of the type of case. Unless there is a change in the constitution,
coun consolidation will require the trial of Jcsser civil and criminal cafies by an eight-person jury.
even though historicaUy these types of cases have been tried in the circuit court by a four- or sixpcrson jury. The consolidated district courts in the Fifth through Eghth Judicial Districts have
been using eight-person juries since J992 without undue problcm.'i. Consolidation of rhe courts
in lhe populous Wasatch Front bas brought with it the need for the same flexibility regarding jury
size. Thal is the reason for the proposed amendment. he said. The flexibility will allow cost

Minutes of the Utah Com;titutional Revision Commission
December 8, 1995
Page 13
savings by pennittingjuries of less than eight in rural distrk1s where consolidation has already
occurred.

Mr. Strong asked if the resolution would be putting in constitution that a capital cac.e jury
shall consist of twelve.
Chief Justice Zimmcnnan explained that currently the constitution stale$ that in ,capital
cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.
Justice Durham noted that there is some !ederal constitutional doctrine to lhe effect that
twelve may be required. She said she did not think it had yet been decided. She expressed
concern shoold the constitutional amendment pa.'iS and not the implementing statute.~.

Mr. RaJpb Dewsnup, Utah Trial Lawyers Assodation. stated any change of lhe
constitution which either grants more power to the Legislature or 1akcs some away shou Id be
closely scrutinized He said anytime there is an amendment. j1 may be considered to amend
everything that preceded it. both by way of judicial interpretation and the text of the constitution
itself. There is not, and never has been. a provision in the state constitution that guaranteed the
right to a civil jury trial. It is an implied right. There are Supreme Court cases that hold that this
section of the constitution grants the right to a civil jury trial. If the constitution is amemded and
the Legislature is granted the authority to set the number of jurors. it can be a potential problem
to allow the Legislature 10 do away with the right to civil trial by specifying that the number of
jurors in certain trials will be Oor 2. He suggested that one way to address lhat potential problem
is to make explicit in the constitution that there i~ an inviolate right to civil jury trial unle.~
wajv~.

Justice Durham said the language suggested by Mr. Dcwsnup would not fix the problem
he raised because civil cases generally would apply possibly to adjudication in juvenile court and

aJso m small claims court.
Chief Justice Zimmennan stated their express intention is not to change anything and not
to affect existing case law. If that intent is expressed in the CRC report to the legislature. it may
address the problem.
Chair McKeachnie pointed out that the commission could put the intent in its report to
the Legislature and make sure that it is read into the record in the House and Senate Journals and
could be in the Voter Information PamphleL
Mt. Sullivan read the Scvenlh Amendment of the United State Constitution. He was not
sure if that language would solve the problem or not.
·v;)
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Justice Durham said that has been constn1ed as a matter of federal law to be extremely
limited. For any statutory rights created by Congress. it is up to Congress to decide whether they
go to a jury or to bench trial.

Mr. Tim Shea, Admlnlstrative Office of the Courts, explained that case law
developing the right lo a jury trial in civil c~s relies on the waiver provision. A right cannot be
waived unless it exist.s; therefore. the Supreme Court inferred thal there was a jury right
established by the original constitution in 1896. The coun relied upon the legislative hi&tOry that
went into that provision to distinguish between cases of common law and case.sin equity.
However. none of that is in the constitution itself. It has all been inferred from the last Lwo
sentences of the constitutional provision which arc lefl undisturbed by the proposed amendment.
Because che amendments only shift the responsibility for establi'thing the size of juries from the
constitution to the Legislature. the change to those few sentences would not change the
jurisprudence that has been built up around the rest of that body of law.

Ms. Wood asked if it would be acceptable to include a sentence stating that in no event
will a jury consist of less than four jurors.
Chief Justice Zimmerman said he did nor think the language suggested by Ms. Wood
answers Mr. Dewsnup•s c-0ncerns. He said language could be added that the right to civil jury
shall not be impaired.
Justice Durham said if Ms. Wood's language were included. it would deal with :\-fr.
Dewsnup's concern about the Legislature using its power to establish the size of juries which
sodal fiC'ie~e rese°"h suggests that could not perform any of the traditional functions of a jury.

Chief Justice Zimmennan said if the commission inserted the language he proposed, it
would addres..it Mr. Dewsnup•s concern, but is vague enough that it does not forbid the growth of
alternative dispute resolution, for example. It would be left to the courts to imply as of the date
of the amendment.
Mr. James Housley. Deputy District Attorney, Salt Lake County. indicated that the
proposal originally repealed and reenacted this section. which be indicated wouJd inadvertently
uproot an entire universe of jurisprudence that has already been developed around the idea of a
jury trial in Utah. (n negotiations with the court administrator's office. the court administrator's
office proposed the alternative cu~nt language. Mr. Housley concurred with the proposal with
the exception of the word ushaJr' on line 19. He expressed concern that one could argue that
people arc entitled to a jury trial1' even for petty offenses. Under federal constitutionaJ J.TOVisjons
there have been a number of cases that have diffcrentiated between petty ca1:,C; and seric-us cases.
he said. The differentiation is basically at six months potential incan:eration but Utah supreme
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Court cases have discussed the differentiation without actually holding that this is what is
covered by the state constitution. He said they would like not to be precluded from using the
federal interpretation. He requested that the use of the word ·•shall" not be intended to change
the jurisprudence surrounding the right to jury trial.

Ms. Watts Baskin asked if there wa.~ another reason, olher than the concern for court
costs. that the change is being proposed.
Chief Justice Zimmerman said they now feel that they can change certain areas and save
money whether it is passed or not. He said it is a flexibility issue. In some of the smaller couns.
it may be harder to physically accommodate eight jurors rather than four, he said.
Justice Durham indicated the Judicial Council's motivation in proposing the amendment
was to maintain the operational status quo under the constitution.

Mr. Sullivan asked if there was a difference between something being inviolate 3J1d
something being impaired.
Chief Justice Zimmerman said he did not think it would make any difference. He felt
legislative history is more important than the prcci~ word chosen when the coon is making an
interpretation of the issue~
Ms. Wood seated that the language proposed by Chief Justice Zimmerman may have the
opposite effect of what is intended by limiting legislative authority.

MOTION: Mr. Sullivan moved to adopt proposed legislation. "Jury Trial Resolution,"
dated 12-7-95 along with the legislative history discussion and with the following amendmenc
Line 19:

after "statute" insen •·• but in no event shall a iury consist of fewer than
four persons"

Ms. Wood indicated thal the proposed language parallels and preserves the cunent
constitutional provision. Currently in courts of inferior jurisdictions, it is four jurors.
The commission voted on the motion which pa.~ unanimously. Sens. Beattie,
Dmitrich. and Hill)·ard and Reps. Harward and P1gnanelli were ~nt during the vote.
Justice Durham urged that the commission's minutes include a reference to the fact that
the commission no more means to impair the right to stipulate to a jury smaJlcr than four than the
current constitution prevents someone from stipulating to a jury smaller than eight.

Mr. EVANS (Weber). If you wlll permit me_l know that you want to get it right.
The substitute which I offer provides that a jury shall be waived in civil cases,
if not demanded, as the Legislature might provide. That makes a provision
that unless a jury is demanded it is waived. That system is in effect now in
New York, Michigan, and Tennessee, and in quite a number of other states,
and I intend to speak about that. It is adopted in those states and the people
are trying a vast number of cases before the courts, without resorting to the
jury at all.
Mr. EICH NOR. I will read it again: "The right of trial by jury shall remain
inviolate, but in civil actions the jury shall consist of nine in district courts, and
in inferior courts of six, or less, as the Legislature may provide; a verdict in
such cases, may be rendered by concurrence by two-thirds of the jurors. A
jury may be waived in civil cases and in misdemeanors by consent of both
parties, expressed in open court." That fixes it in the bill of rights. We know
exactly what we have. We know exactly what we present to the people; there
can be no misgivings in the minds of the people when we present the
Constitution for their adoption or rejection.
"In civil actions or misdemeanors the jury may consist of any number, less
than the number fixed in this section." I think that comes right down to the root
of all this argument. Let us fix it in the bill of rights and fix it such a way that a
Legislature in simple aberration of the mind will not endanger the jury system.
I believe we ought to show something for our work, ought to show something
for the time we are consuming here. Fix it right in the bill of rights, and we
know what we have and no one can take it from us. All this talk about bulwark
of liberty_what will be the bulwark of liberty in in Utah? The bill of rights will be
the main spring of the liberty of this State, and I hope that every amendment
will be voted down, and when the time comes I shall introduce this.
Mr. BOWDLE. The bill, as amended by Mr. Van Horne, does not meet my
approbation. Neither does the one that was introduced by the gentleman from
Weber. There is one trouble with the amendment as I see it introduced by Mr.
Evans, that is this: It provides that in offenses less than a felony a person may
be tried by a jury of less than twelve; the argument that the gentleman has
made against a jury of twelve is broken in my opinion by his concession that in
all criminal cases it shall be twelve. If it shall be twelve in all criminal cases of
felony, why, if nine is so good, if nine be such an admirable jury, or any jury
less then nine be such a great institution, why does he concede that when we
come to try a man for his life, it shall be twelve. The very admission is that a

jury of twelve is better than nine. He admits it when he makes that argument.
I. claim that a man's liberty is not in jeopardy only when the doors of the
penitentiary may stand before him, or when his life is at stake. His reputation
might be just as sacred, or more sacred than his life. I believe that when a
man is on trial for any crime he should have a fair and impartial {292} trial by a
jury, as the gentleman concedes the best jury, that is a jury of twelve, and for
that reason I am not in favor of that amendment. I am not in favor of a sliding
jury system. I believe we ought to know what kind of a jury we are going to
have. If we are going to have a jury of twelve men, let us have a jury of twelve,
and not leave it to the Legislature. If we are going to have a jury of nine, let us
say so, and not have a jury this year of nine, and the next Legislature that
meets thinks that is not quite good enough and they make a change, saying
we have a jury of twelve. We have a jury of twelve for two years. The next
Legislature comes along and says that it is too much expense, let us cut it
down to eight, or six, or five. People rebel against it and you keep going
back, and from that one thing to the other all the time, and you do not know
where you are. Gentlemen, let me ask you this question. Solve it each one for
yourself; if you had grave property interests at stake would you prefer to have
a jury of eight, a jury of twelve, or a jury of four? On general principles,
everything else being equal, there is not a man in this house, I do not believe,
even the gentleman that has argued that the jury system should be cut down,
but would say I will take the largest number you give me. Why? Because he
feels that in that his interests are more nearly protected than in the smaller
number. He feels that the opportunities for the other side to come around and
work the jury, are not so good. Therefore, I am not in favor of cutting the jury
down to a smaller number.
I can see my way to vote for a jury of nine, but as I now see it, I cannot
consent to vote to give it into the hands of the Legislature, to make it any
number less than that. Nor, am I in favor of referring it to them to fix any
number.
I say let us fix it here now and settle that matter. Why, says the gentleman, we
are progressing. Yes, it has taken
five hundred years to come from a jury of twelve down to have this
Convention say that a jury of nine will do. If it takes five hundred years to
come from the idea of twelve down to nine, I think we can safely fix it at nine
and rest easy there for a time at least. We are not going to grow so rapidly at
that ratio, that we will need to have a jury of five or six in the age of the
gentleman that has just been speaking. One thing further on that same thing.
It is said that it is a great saving of expense_a great saving of expense. The

Official Ballot Title:

For
· Against

Shall the Utah Constitution be amended to modify the
provisions on jury size for certain types of court cases
so that: (a) juries in capital cases must consist of twelve
persons, (b)juries in all other felony cases must consist
of al least eight. and (c) juries in other cases must have
their sizes established by the Legislature, but in no
event can a jury be less than four?
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Proposition
No. 3
JURY TRIAL RESOLUTION
Votes cast by the members of the Legislature at the
1996 General Session on final passage:
HOUSE (75 members): Yeas, 69; Nays, 3; Absent, 3.
SENATE (29 members): Yeas, 28; Nays, I; Absen1, 0.

Impartial Analysis
Proposal

by a twelve member jury in the district court would still be
tried by the same size juries in the consoliduted district court.

Proposition 3 amends the present provisions in the Utah
Constitution which establish jury sizes based upon which
courr hears the case and instead provides for jury size to be established based upon which type of case the court hears. The
proposal also imposes a restriction on the Legislature that in
no event shall a jury consist of less than four persons.

Unless there is a change in the Utah Constitution. the
present constitutional language will require the trial of lesser
civil and criminal cases by an eight member jury in the consolidated district courts, even though these types of cases historically have been tried in the circuit court by a four or six member jury.

Jury Sizes and Proposed Constitutional Changes
i

\

The Legislature and the Judiciary have consolidated the
circuit courts into the district courts, eliminating the circuit
courts. This change means that circuit courts, courts of inferior jurisdiction which heard less complicated and less serious
civil and criminal ma11ers. no longer exist, and district courts.
courts of general jurisdiction. try the types of cases the circuit
cour1s previously handled while retaining their own caseload
as district courts. Courts of general jurisdiction, district
courts. are presently required by Article I, Section 10 to have
an eight member jury in all cases, except in capital cases which
require twelve jurors.

Legislation Effective on Passage of Proposition 3

S.8. 53, Trial by Jury, 1996 General Session. will become
law on January I. 1997 only if Proposition 3 is approved. The
bill retains language on capital and felony case size juries. retains the denial of jury trials in small claims cases, :.ind retains
the right of parties 10 agree 10 a lesser-sized jury in all cases
except capital cases. S.B. 53 changes jury sizes in other types
of cuses in the district court. designates that a verdict must be
unanimous in criminal cases and not less than three-fourths of
the jurors in civil cases, and repeals the language specifying
jury sizes in justice court cases. The bill eliminates juries in
juvenile court in the adjudications of minors charged with
what would constitute a crime if commillcd by an adult.

Under this proposal. all cases that were tried at the circuit
court with a four member jury, such as Class 8 and C misdemeanor trials. would still be tried with a four member jury in
the consolidated district courl. Similarly, all cases that were
tried at the circuit court with a six member jury, such as Class
A misdemeanor trials. would still be tried with a six member
jury in the consolidated district court. Felony cases currently
tried hy an eight member jury or capital cases currently tried

Effective Date

Proposition 3 takes effect January I. 1997.
Fiscal Impact

Proposition 3 should result in reduced jury costs.
27

l l-27-95 DRAFT

1996F L-0689/003

JURY TRIAL RESOLUTION
2

l 996 GENERAL SESSION

3

STATE OF UTAH

4

A JOINT RESOLUTION OF THE LEOISLA ruRE PROPOSING TO AMEND THE UTAH

5

CONSTITIJTION; AMENDING THE PROVISIONS ON TRIAL BY JllRY; PRESERVING

6

THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL JURY IN CRIMINAL CASES; REPEALING THE
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REQlJIREMENT OF EIGHT-PERSON JURIES IN GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS;
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AND PROVIDING AN EFFECTIVE DA TE.

9
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This resolution proposes to change the Utah Constitution as follows:
RtPeM~ kNf> ltcENAC f s:· ..:f1J"f: :1,,. i) :; ;
ARTICLE I, SECTION 10

12

Be ii re.folved by the LegislaJure of the stale of Ulah, two-thirds ofall members ekctrd to each

13

ofthe two houses voting infavor th£reof

Section 1. lt is proposed to repea and reenad Artic1e I. Section 1o. Utah Cons!itution, to

14
JS

16

l

~1,f-Ultc_.,

read:
Art~I, Section 10. (Trial by jary.J

~-----

20

f!arties have-lb$......riiJ,t to trial by jury in an,y crimjnal s:,a in which the h~Ki:.Iature has
established a term ofincarceiMio,n as a p<>Miblc; seotence, The riaht to trial by iYO' in ciyjl cases
is preseryed. A iuzy in a civil case is wiJhie9-~.unless demanded, The verdict in a criminal ca.'iC shall
he unanimous The verdict in a civil case shall l»bzoot less than three-fourths of the jurors, A

21

trial bro: shall coosist of twelve peaom io a CHPiJal cast,, ~"llislnlure shall have lhc power

22

Jo implerumt the provisions of this section.
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/ -~ Section 2. Submittal to eltctors.
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Jbe lieutenant ~vernm: is directed to submit this pmposed amendment to the electors of

the state oft Jtah at the next

""eraJ election in the manner provided by law!

Section 3. Effective date.

If approved by the electors of the state, the amendment pmposed by this joint resolution
shall take effect on JammO' I, t 997.
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pi!flJotJ!:l.
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532b PcrtSott <J~tmpt mnyIM:rrve 11 w.bum.
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.
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1J1v,gh1t:.~ttni1 or
ru, uu lflW f u1 or ruoturaij :ia:setu y. rucutH)ll(,"(,11 n1 Uu~ Chapter. u.Jl't;jtflf9CI
3'r"ft1tti'.1bg to
u(•~ lN:~ts to pr(•cn~<td tu tbe pluwt~ nf us.t'iCJn bly. or n~ neur there- r6ot.tfi).
~o u,.q IH~ t1ruu with ~nfety, v11nd t,n t~xerd~e tho authority witb
whit~h ho iH hn·c~tec.11 for f-Ul)J>irc~ing the S!Ul.uc nnd u.1 t"t~t.ing
t hu offendcrij, lie h1' guilty of 1.1 1nitidcn10Jutor.
§ ,& :;UH~ (~,in Eve.ry per~on who a1ut,11i~e~ in, iruJtigaitcs, lltyl10 ~lbcs,,
(•ncouragc~, or proanot.es ''"·'' rh1g ,,r pri_:,_.p tight. or any other
1o
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pr,.~rnt-ditatod fitrht or contention, ( witJ1ot1t. d,e,indly wrruapont:t ),
f.'.'itbcr us p1•incip~al. nid, t«lcornd., u,upirt,, 8U1rg4,..10u~ 01· other..
~ wi~(~. i~ llunisbimble hy impriMonm_(Hit,- iu the penitentiary not
•~xee-ediug two yc~srfil.
f 4.Mf 1. '~111> }~v<.iry 1,erf.lon wilfully pre~ent n.s a tstpcc- Pivre1•Da pNJo
vD
tntA•r =~t. nny fight or contention n1c.nU,,ned in tht1 p1·,,cedi111g i;ti~ pr~~o
H4~etion, i~ ~111ilty of a 111i~den1eau1or.
§ •!508. <~11-'1-~ Every pe1·~on who 1nt1Ucious1y and wUfuHy 1uutiu.rlb11nglt~~
dhdurb~ U1t3 peace or c-iui(~t or ~ny u~ighborhoodt fa,ruily t or p¢tu('~..
p,ehu,nt by loud ,1r, Ut'tlU8Ut1l noil1-le, or by t.nnnaltnou'11" or offen=
11'ive •~orHluet, or by threateuing, trniducing, c1uurr~U11g, challt~nging to tight., or fighting, iH puni~buhlo by fine not, ox<~-+din~ two huudrcd dolhb.rM, 01· by iunpriacuuneut. iu t.b,, · oounty
~
juil not exceeding two n1onths.
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JURY DISAGREf.S, ..

On Monday or thls week, Messrs D.
A. Ducbannon, Charles Robinette and
William Halling were baled lt!to Juslice Christensen's court charged with.
1violating the city ord!nanca. The defendants were arrested for peddling:
j fn1lt at the 0. S. L. Ra!lroad station,.
: !n violation o! Sec. 83 or Chapter 18:
!oC the City Ordir.ance, which rea<b as:
follows, ",\ny person who shall ply any·
Ivocation upon the platform or ground
o! any railroad company, •• • • • wltb.1out the consent or said company • • • •
shall, upon ccn viction lhcrco!, he p:in!shed by a fine o! not less than /Ive nor·
mora
than one hundred dollars Cor
1
each oll'cnse."
The defendants demanded a jury
. trial nnd four c!tlzens were secured to ·
pnss upon t11e evidence prcsente~. The
city called a number or witnesses to
prove thnt the defendants had been
Iselling fruit on the station platform
on the east side or the tracks and !t
was also brought out that the railroad
company bad granted the sole priv!lege ot selling fruit on its property to
Knudson Dros. The defense ~rgued
that lo as much as tl'.e city sold the defendants a llcense to peddle fruit nt
the depot, the city was morally obi!·
&ated to protect them In their rights
nnd see that they bad tlie privilege
or selling frnlt.,
Tho case went to the jurr In , the
forenoon on Monday and the jury got
"hung" abortly nrter retiring_ They"
deliberated until nfght foll and then
notified the Court thnt It was lmpos•
s lhlo to asre·e on a ,·erdict. One held.
out for the enforcement of the city or1
tllnance and the otber three stood al i;nlnst the city. The Justice, upon be•
j in:; advised or the condition discbarge<1 the jury and \hen dlschnrgcd the
defendants nnd so the case ended.
1 No llttfe discussion has been caused
1
I by the proceedlnss' and the turn ot
I
'
' nlrnlrs ri.nd senUmeut cnn be found rav•
orlni;"botb sides.
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